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ADMINISTRATIVE LAw-PwER OF ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN-COURT WILL
Nor ENJom I s SEIZURE OF PROPERTY As ENEMY OwNE.-The plaintiff, a
friendly alien engaged in the insurance business, brought a bill in equity to enjoin
the trustee of a fund established for the security of the plaintiff's American
policy holders from paying over to the Alien Property Custodian pursuant to his
demand certain funds found by the Custodian to be the property of an alien
enemy, not licensed by the President Motion was made for an injunction
pendente lite. Held, that the motion be denied and the bill dismissed. Sala-
mandra Ins. Co. v. New York Life Ins. etc. Co. (i918, U. S. D. C., S. D. N. Y.)
6o N. Y. L. J., Jan. 3, I919.
The state of war justifies the seizure not only of enemy persons, but of enemy
owned private property. Brown v. United States (1814, U. S.) 8 Cranch iio;
Miller v. United States (I87b, U. S.) ii Wall. 268. But in modern times this
has merely involved sequestration, not confiscation, of the property, the purpose
being to prevent its use for the benefit of the enemy in arms. See COMMENTS,
sUPra, p. 478. In the instant case, a Russian insurance company had relieved its
former general agents, German subjects in Germany, from the power of doing
business in America and had transferred the American agency to an American
firm. This firm had set aside from premiums received a certain sum whose
ownership was in issue. The Custodian deemed it to be the property of the
German general agents and demanded its surrender. The Court seemed inclined
to consider it the property of the Russian Company, but nevertheless refused to
enjoin its surrender to the Custodian, on the ground that the Trading with the
Enemy Act (sec. 9) made the Custodian's determination of ownership unreview-
able judicially, except in proceedings following and not preceding the transfer
of possession to him. This seems in accord with principle. To enjoin the
Custodian might defeat the purposes of the Act, which were of the utmost
public importance. See In re Kastner & Co., Ltd. (1917, Eng. Ch.) 33 Times L.
R. i49. The position of the enemy arrested under Presidential warrant or of
the tax payer whose property is distrained for non-payment of taxes is
analogous. To enjoin the marshal or the tax collector would defeat the purposes
of government The arrested alien can try the legality of the governmental act
in habeas corpus proceedings, the tax payer in an action at law against the
collector. Pittsburg, etc. Ry. v. Board of Public Works of West Virginia (I898)
172 U. S. 92, 19 Sup. Ct go. Probably the sale of sequestered property might
be enjoined, as incidental to proceedings under the Act to determine ownership.
Inasmuch as the seizure and sale of enemy property is derived from the power
to kill the enemy, it is somewhat doubtful, as a matter of international law,
whether such power of sale survives the armistice; or whether it constitutes
a belligerent necessity under the power "of disposition to the limits of the
necessity" sanctioned in Miller v. United States, supra.
CON7LIC OF LAwS-STATUTE OF LIMrATIONS-AcIoN BARRED U-Da STATUTE
,oF FoRum.-In an action brought in Italy on an English contract the defendant
pleaded the Italian statute of limitations in bar to the action. The plaintiff
replied that the English statute governed and that this statute had not yet run.
Held, that the enforcement of the English statute of limitations would violate
the public policy of the forum and conflict therefore with Art 12 of the
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Preliminary Provisions of the Italian Civil Code. Sala v. Model (i916, App.
Milan) 2 Rivista di Diritto Commerciale, i916, 896.
See COMMENTS, p. 492.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ADMIRALTY-STATE STATUTE OF FRAUDs NOT APPLICAL
To MARITIME CoNRAcr.-In a libel in admiralty in the United States District
Court the claimant alleged an oral contract entered into in California with thie
owner of a vessel, to proceed to Alaska with the vessel and after arrival there to
serve one year as master. One of the defenses was that the California Statute of
Frauds rendered the alleged contract unenforcible since it was not to be per-
formed within a year. Held, that the contract was of a maritime character and
not subject to the California statute. Union Fish Co. v. Erickson (i919) 39 Sup.
Ct. 112.
Art. 3, sec. 2, of the Federal Constitution extends the judicial power of the
United States "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." The effect
of this grant upon the powers of the states to determine the legal consequences
which shall attach to maritime transactions within their borders is even today in
doubt. In some cases the federal district courts, which by congressional enact-
ment "have exclusive, original cognizance of all civil cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, . . . saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common
law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it," have applied
common law principles unknown to the maritime law in giving relief, and this has
been sanctioned by the Supreme Court. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek
(913) 234 U. S. 52, 34 Sup. Ct. 733 (libel by stevedore in personam against
the master for personal injuries suffered while loading a ship). So also the
Supreme Court has recognized that a state statute may lay down the rule for the
decision of a maritime case in the federal courts. Peyroux v. Howard (1833)
7 Pet. 324 (libel in rem against vessel allowed where state statute gave lien
when none existed according to the general maritime law) ; The Lottawanna (1874)
21 Wall. 558 (lien for repairs on vessel in home port); The Hamilton (i9o7)
207 U. S. 398, 28 Sup. Ct. 133 (state statute giving damages for wrongful death).
See also La Bourgogne (19o8) 210 U. S. 95, 28 Sup. Ct. 664, and note in L. R. A.
i916A 1157. On the other hand we find cases refusing to apply the state law-
common or statutory. Workman v. Mayor of New York (igoo) 179 U. S. 552,
21 Sup. Ct. 212 (refusing to apply rule of the common law of the state where
the injury happened, which exempted a municipal corporation from the operation
of the principle of respon4deat superior in the case of the city fire department) ;
The Roanoke (19o3) i89 U. S. i85, 23 Sup. Ct 491 (state law cannot create lien
for materials used in repairing a foreign ship). The attempt to reconcile these
and other more or less siniilar cases led to the unfortunate "five to four" decision
in Southern Pacific Railway Co. v. Jensen (1917) 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 525,
commented upon in (97) 27 YALE LAw JourmAL, 255. The immediate effect
of that decision was to prevent the application to maritime injuries of state laws
providing for workmen's compensation, even in the state courts. Congress has
attempted to remedy this by a recent statute. See Cimmino v. John T. Clark &
Son (i918, App. Div.) 172 N. Y. Supp. 478, discussed in (1918) 28 YAIm LAw
JOURNAL, 281. The general principle laid down in the opinion of the majority
in the Jensen case-to the effect that state legislation is invalid "if it works
material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or
interferes with the proper harmony or uniformity of that law in its international
or interstate relations"-was cited in the present case in support of the conclusion
reached. It is indeed difficult to reconcile all the decisions with this general
principle, and it is still true, as Mr. Justice McReynolds remarked in the Jensen
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case, that it is "difficult, if not impossible, to define with exactness just how far
the general maritime law may be changed, modified, or affected by state legisla-
tion." Additional legislation by Congress upon the subject would seem to be
desirable
CoNsTrrTIoNAL LAw-RuATioN OF INTERSTATE COMMERcE-VALIDITY OF
THE "Ram AmENDmET."--The so-called "Reed Amendment" provides as
follows: ". .. Whoever shall order, purchase, or cause intoxicating liquors to
be transported in interstate commerce, except for scientific, sacramental,
medicinal, and mechanical purposes, into any State or Territory the laws of
which State or Territory prohibit the manufacture or sale therein of intoxicating
liquors for beverage purposes," shall be punished as aforesaid: Provided, That
nothing herein shall authorize the shipment of liquor into any State contrary to
the laws of such State . . ." The defendant carried for his own personal use
a quart of intoxicating liquor from Kentucky into West Virginia, a state in which
the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes was then
prohibited. Held, that the act of the defendant was a violation of the Amend-
ment and that the latter was a valid regulation of interstate commerce.
McReynolds and Clarke, JJ., dissenting. The United States v. Hill (1919) 39
Sup. Ct 143.
The district court had sustained a demurrer to the indictment chiefly on the
ground that the statute did not cover transportation for purely personal use.
The Supreme Court rejected this contention and also held that the prohibition
of the statute was within the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
In the light of previous decisions it is difficult to see how a different conclusion
could have been reached by the court. In the absence of congressional regula-
tion, states cannot constitutionally exclude articles coming from other states if
they are generally recognized as legitimate subjects of commerce. This is put
on the ground that such a matter requires national regulation and that the
inaction of Congress means that interstate commerce in such articles is to
remain open. Leisy v. Hardin (i8go) 135 U. S. ioo, io Sup. Ct. 681. Congress,
however, has the power to determine that a given matter does not require
national regulation and so may permit the state laws to operate, In re Rahrer
(1891) 140 U. S. 545, 1I Sup. Ct 865 (holding the "Wilson Act" valid). It can
also entirely forbid interstate transportation of such articles as intoxicating
liquors, lottery tickets, etc., even though state laws permit their manufacture and
sale. Lottery Case (19o3) 188 U. S. 321, 23 Sup. Ct 321 (lottery tickets) ; Hoke
v. United States (1913) 227 U. S. 308, 33 Sup. Ct 281 (white slave law);
United States v. Popper (1899) 98 Fed. 423 (articles intended for the prevention
of conception). Cf. also The Abby Dodge (1912) 223 U. S. 166, 32 Sup. Ct 310
(excluding from importation deep sea sponges taken by divers-a conservation
measure). Moreover, the operation in a particular state of the federal prohibi-
tion of interstate commerce in a given article can be made conditional upon the
existence of a state law making the bringing of the article into the state in
question a criminal offense. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co.
(1916) 242 U. S. 311, 37 Sup. Ct. 18o (sustaining the "Webb Kenyon" Law),
commented on in (1917) 26 YALE LAw JoURNAL, 399. The principal case goes
one step farther, holding that the operation in a particular state of the federal
prohibition of interstate commerce in a given article can be made conditional
upon the existence in that state of a state law which while it prohibits the
manufacture or sale of the article, does not forbid its importation from other
states. The dissenting justices argued that all that the earlier cases had held
was that Congress could permit the state laws to operate, not that Congress could
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itself conditionally prohibit This was true of the decision under the Wilson
Act-Leisy v. Hardin--but the opinion in the Clark Distilling Co. case made it
very clear that the Webb Kenyon law was sustained on the ground stated above.
The nearest analogy is probably that of local option laws, where the state law
goes into operation or ceases to operate within a particular portion of the state
according to the number of votes cast for or against the proposition involved.
Such laws art generally held valid. The cases and arguments of both sides of
that question are fully collected in the two cases which follow. State ex rel.
Witter v. Forkner (1895) 94 Iowa, I, 62 N. W. 772; Fouts v. Hood River (1905)
46 Ore. 492, 81 Pac. 370.
CONTRACTs-ILLEGALaTY-COMBINATION To OBTAiN CONTRACT FROm GOVFN-
MENT.-The plaintiffs and the defendant, contractors, agreed to join efforts to
obtain for the defendant from the United States Government a contract for
construction of a military camp. All were to share in performance and in
distribution of profits. It was known that the contract would be let not on
competitive bids, but on a cost plus percentage basis, with special reference to
ability to construct rapidly. The defendant secured the contract; the plaintiffs
sued to recover their agreed share of the profits. Held, that the plaintiffs were
entitled to relief, as the contract was not against public policy. Anderson v.
Blair (I918, Ala.) 8o So. 31.
The plaintiff, a member of the Imperial Air Fleet Committee, undertook to use
his influence with Government officials to secure capital for the development of
the defendant's business, for which service he was to be paid a commission.
The Government subsequently made an advance to the defendant to assist him in
the production of war materials. An action was brought for the unpaid balance
of the commission, while the defendant counterclaimed for the part already paid.
Held, that the contract was illegal and void as contrary to public policy, and
would not be enforced in.spite of the defendant's failure to plead the illegality,
nor would recovery be allowed of the amount already paid under it Monteflore
v. Menday Motor Company (1918, K. B.) 119 L. T. Rep. 340.
Combination to obtain contracts from the government is not, today, illegal
in itself; and contracts so to combine will be normally enforced by the courts.
Hegness v. Chilberg (1915, C. C. A. 9th) 224 Fed. 28. It is otherwise when the
use of improper means and influence is provided for, which tend to injuriously
affect the public service. A contract secured by such means can not of course
be enforced against the government. Crocker v. United States (i916) 246- U. S.
74, 36 Sup. Ct 245. Nor can the parties, as being in par delicto, enforce among
themselves an agreement so to procure a government contract. Gulick' v. Ward
(1829, Sup. Ct.) io N. J. L. 87; but cf. Whalen v. Brennan (1892) 34 Neb. i29,
51 N. W. 759 (agreement not to press a bid already entered); on the general
subject of pari delicto, see (igr5) 24 YALE LA W JOURNAL, 255; (1gi8) 27 ibid.
iogo. This holds true although the contract is harmless on its face, where the
means used to carry it out are illegal. McMullen v. Hoffman (i899) 174 U. S.
639, i9 Sup. Ct. 839. And where a tendency which contravenes public policy is
apparent in the terms of the agreement, enforcement is refused at once, without
inquiry into whether the actual proceedings of the parties under that agreement
were unlawful. Henry County v. Citizens' Bank of Windsor (i9o7) 208 Mo.
209, 234; io6 S. W. 622, 628; Brown v. Columbus First National Bank (1894)
137 Ind. 655, 37 N. E. i58. And the position of the Montefiore case is sustained
by authority, that where the illegality appears on the face of the declaration, or
is disclosed by the plaintiff's evidence, the court will of its own motion refuse
enforcement, whether or not the defendant pleads or seeks to waive illegality.
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Holman v. Johnson (i775, K. B.) I Cowp. 341; Northwestern Salt Co. v.
Electrolytic Alkali Co. (C. A.) [i913] 3 K B. 4=, 424; Oscanyan v. Arms Co.
(i88o) io3 U. S. 261, 266. Inasmuch as, where there is no question of bribery,
the evil of combination appears to lie almost wholly in stifling competitive bids,
the holding in Anderson v. Blair seems undoubtedly sound, there being no ques-
tion of bidding, and the tendency of the combination being rather to serve the
government's purpose of speedy construction. The closely related question of
hiring a man to use his "influence" to procure contracts or advances from the
government involves delicate problems of policy and of fact. Where "influence"
means only able advocacy, or the weight of reputation for honest, sound judg-
ment, it would seem unobjectionable. Where it meant the jockeying of a
hanger-on, our" Supreme Court has condemned it flatly. Providence Tool Co. v.
Norris (1864) 2 Wall. 45. Much would seem to turn on the soundness of the
proposition advanced, and of the person or firm to be benefited, as in the
Monteflore case. And it is believed that both of the cases last cited were
influenced by the fact that a person of official or semi-official position was
involved in the agreement.
INJUNCIoNs-JRISDIcTION oF STATE CouRT To ENjoIN SUIT IN ANoTHER
STATE COuRx-RsoNS FOR ExEcIs--A Georgia railway corporation was
sued in Georgia for the death of plaintiff's husband resulting from an accident
which occurred in Alabama. Plaintiff and her deceased husband were residents
of Alabama. The Georgia corporation sought an injunction from the Alabama
courts restraining the farther prosecution of the Georgia action. It alleged that
the plaintiff in the damage suit had chosen the Georgia courts in order to evade
the "stop, look, and listen" rule of Alabama, which rule, it alleged, did not obtain
in Georgia. Held, that the Georgia corporation was not entitled to the injunction.
Sayre and Somerville, JJ., dissenting. Folkes v. Central of Georgia R. Co. (1918,
Ala.) 8o So. 458.
A resident of Georgia obtained personal service in Tennessee upon another
resident of Georgia while the. latter was temporarily in Tennessee. The
operative facts constituting the cause of action-one of so-called transitory charac-
ter-occurred in Georgia. The defendant in the Tennessee action sought an
injunction from the Georgia courts to restrain the farther prosecution of the
action in Tennessee. The petition for the injunction alleged, but in .general
language only, that the law of Tennessee applicable to the case differed from that
of Georgia and that the suit was brought there rather than in Georgia in order
to "harrass and annoy" the petitioner into paying the amount demanded rather
than to go to the expense of a suit in Tennessee. Held, that the petition stated
no grounds for equitable relief. McDaniel v. Alford (igi8, Ga.) 97 S. E. 673.
It is well settled that a court of equity has jurisdiction, i. e., power, to enjoin
litigants personally subject to its jurisdiction from prosecuting suits in other
jurisdictions. Portarlington v. Soulby (1834, Eng. Ch.) 3 My. & K. 104; Story,
Equity Jurisdiction (i 4th ed.) sec. 1224. It was at one time supposed that the
courts of one state had no power to enjoin a suit in the courts of another state.
Story, op. cit., sec. 1225. But the law has long been settled to the contrary.
Kempson v. Kempson (1899, Ch.) 58 N. J. Eq. 94, 43 At. 97; 14 R. C. L. 412.
However, there is much conflict as to when the jurisdiction will be exercised.
The commonest case is where a resident of one state is seeking to evade the
laws of his domicile by suing in another state-as, for example, where he sues
in the foreign court to evade an exemption law of his own state. In such cases
it is usual to grant an injunction. Wilson v. Joseph (1886) iog Ind. 490; Teeger
v. Landsley (1886) 69 Iowa, 725; (i888) 23 CENT. L. J. 268. So also where the
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court is satisfied that the suit in the other state is "vexatious." Clflin & Co. v.
Hamlin (188i, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 62 How. Pr. 284. In a case in Alabama decided
prior to the Folkes case the facts were substantially identical with that case except
that both parties were citizens of Alabama. The injunction was granted. Weaver
v. Alabama, etc. R. Co. (917, Ala.) 76 So. 364. Where, as in the Folkes case, the
one asking the injunction is being sued in his own state there seems less reason
for interference. In favor of an injunction, however, is the fact that the
operative facts all occurred in Alabama, the parties and presumably the witnesses
resided there, and the law applicable to determine the substantive rights of the
parties is that of Alabama. On the other hand there is the fact that in this and
other similar situations the substantive rights of the parties would, according to
well-recognized principles of the Conflict of Laws, be settled in other states by
the rule laid down by the law of the place where the transaction took place.
This is frequently overlooked. For example, in one case an injunction 'as
granted to prevent a bailor from suing a carrier in another jurisdiction where
it was alleged the measure of damages would be much larger than in the state
granting the injunction. Dinsmore v. Neresheimer (1884, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 32
Hun, 204. On the facts of that case the court in the state in which the action
enjoined was brought would, if the case were properly presented, clearly have
applied the law of the state granting the injunction. In justification of the
Weaver case, however, was the fact that the Georgia courts had refused to apply
to an "Alabama cause of action" the "stop, look, and listen rule" of that state.
Krogg v. Atlanta, etc. R. Co. (1886) 77 Ga. 2o2. The result in the McDaniel
case seems contrary to that reached by most courts and can hardly be supported
as a desirable rule. There was every reason why on the state of facts presented
the action should have been tried in Georgia. The operative facts all occurred
in that jurisdiction. Both parties and probably the necessary witnesses resided
there. The law applicable was that of Georgia. It is difficult to see why a
Georgia court should on such a state of facts permit one of its residents to
compel another resident to go to the trouble and expense of presenting to a
foreign tribunal evidence of both the facts and the Georgia law, even if that
tribunal would, if the case were properly presented, apply the Georgia law.
JUDGMENTS-EFFEC OF DISSOLVING INJUNCTION IMPOSED FOR A TRIAL PERIOD-
RECOVERY BY CARRIE OF FAIR VALUE OF SERvics.--A statute of North Dakota
prescribed certain rates to be charged by common carriers. By injunction the
railroad was compelled to put these into effect A writ of error was taken up
to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the decree without prejudice to the carrier
to reopen the case if, after a trial period, the rates proved confiscatory.
Subsequently, the case was reopened and the rates were declared to be confis-
catory, whereupon a new decree was entered dissolving the injunction. The
instant action was brought by the carrier to recover from a shipper the difference
between a reasonable rate and the rate which the carrier had been compelled
to charge during the period of probation. Held, that the carrier could not
recover. Minneapolis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Washburn Coal Co. (1918, N. D.) 168
N. W. 684.
Where a cause is dismissed "without prejudice," the form of the decree merely
bars the plea of res judicata. Bucholz-Hill Trans. Co. v. Baxter (1912) 206 N. Y.
173, 99 N. E. I8o; Ann. Cas. I9i4A 1105, and note. Where a court, having
jurisdiction and acting under a statute that is apparently constitutional, enters a
judgment, absolute in form, but without prejudice to the reopening of the
proceedings, the decree is res judicata for the period that it is in force, even if
it is subsequently replaced by another. See Missouri Rate Cases (1912) 23o
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U. S. 474, 508; 33 Sup. Ct. 976; Missouri v. Chicago etc. R. R. (915) 241 U. S.
533, 36 Sup. Ct. 715. Consequently, when a subsequent decree is entered dismiss-
ing the first, the new decree has no retroactive force, but merely concerns the
future. It is generally held that where a decree is merely erroneous and not
void, a party acting in pursuance of same will be protected, even though it is
superseded by a reversal that is retroactive. See Ann. Cas. 1914C 542, note;
Clark v. Rodes (1876, Ky.) 12 Bush 13. The same rule should hold where a
judgment is entered, absolute for a limited time, but subject to change or
dismissal thereafter. So in the principal case: cf. Missouri v. Chicago, etc. R. R.,
supra; see also Knoxville v. Water Co. (i9o8) 212 U. S. I, 29 Sup. Ct. 148.
Because of this, the rights of parties who contracted while the first judgment
was in force should be considered as finally determined by that judgment and
should not be subject to change if that decree is superseded. Henderson v. Folk-
stone Waterworks Co. (1885, Q. B. D.) i Times L. R. 329 (suit to recover over-
charge by the public service corporation); see also Missouri v. Chicago, etc.
R. R., supra; Palmer v. Foley (1877) 71 N. Y. io6. Justice may dictate that
the carrier be permitted a recovery, where he has been compelled to render
service at a confiscatory rate. But justice also dictates that the shipper, who has
based his charges to his vendees on the rates charged him at the time for
carriage, should not be held to a liability of which he could have no notice, to
reimburse the carrier. Any criticism must therefore be directed against the
decree which, in putting the debatable rates into effect for a trial period, failed to
provide by bond or action for indemnifying the carrier in case those rates should
prove confiscatory.
MoNo oLIEs-SHERmAN AcT AND CLAYTON AcT-RFUSING TO SE.LL TO
CUSTOMERS WHo CuT PascEs-Colgate & Company, a corporation, was indicted
under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act for entering into a combination in restraint of
trade because it agreed with its customers individually upon reasonable prices at
which its products might be resold, and declined to deal with those who would not
maintain such prices. A demurrer was interposed. Held, that the indictment
charged no offense. United States v. Colgate & Co. (1918, E. D. Va.) 253 Fed.
522.
The manufacturer of Goodyear automobile tires, an Ohio corporation, and its
exclusive selling agent, a New York corporation, refused to sell its tires to the
plaintiff, a dealer in automobile accessories, because he had cut prices established
by the defendants for the resale of their products, and they also declined to sell
to other dealers because they sold to the plaintiff contrary to the defendants' rule
that their dealers should sell only to 'consumers. Upon these facts the plaintiff
sought to recover treble damages upon two causes of action (i) under the
Sherman Act and (2) under the Clayton Act. The defendants demurred. Held,
that the complaint stated no cause of action. Baran v. The Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. (1919, U. S. D. C., S. D. N. Y.) 6o N. Y. L. J. 1513 (Feb. 7, 1919).
It has been established in recent years by the court of final authority that a
manufacturer or dealer cannot by printed notice attached to the goods he sells
impose restrictions on their resale price which will bind persons into whose hands
they may later come; nor can he by contract with his immediate vendee impose
a contractual duty upon the latter to maintain resale prices. And this is true not
only of ordinary chattels but also of patented and copyrighted articles. Dr.-Miles
Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co. (1911) 22o U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376; Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co. (1917) 243 U. S. 502, 37 Sup.
Ct 376; see also (1917) 26 YALE LAW Jot'R1NAL, 27o, 6oo, and (I918) 27 ibid.
397. Such notices and contracts are unenforcible because they are thought to be
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in restraint of trade and hence illegal both at common law and under the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act. Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co.
(1918) 246 U. S. 8, 22, 38 Sup. Ct 257, 259; but see dissent of Holmes, J. in
Dr. Miles Medical Co. case. These authorities, howvever, are not conclusive on
the question presented by the two recent cases under discussion. Discrimination
between the several classes of cases is necessary. The first class relates to the
vendor's legal powers as to third parties: he has no power to impose price
restrictions on any sub-vendee in respect to goods with the title to which he has
parted. The second class relates to his rights against the immediate vendee: he
can acquire no right that the latter shall resell at an agreed price. The third
class, exemplified by the instant cases, relates to his privileges: he is privileged,
both as against his customer- and as against the State, to refuse to deal with
customers who decline to maintain reasonable resale prices. Obviously a man
is generally privileged to sell or to refrain from selling his products for any
reason he pleases. When a business is affected with a public interest, like
railroading, the owner may lose his privilege of refusing to deal with a customer
for capricious reasons. When the exercise of a privilege is contrary to public
policy as declared by some statute, it may be lost. But it is believed that the
above cases are right in construing the Shernan Act as not destroying this
privilege of a manufacturer who has no monopoly of the market, and especially
when the resale prices he seeks to maintain are not unreasonable. Earlier cases
are in accord. See Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co.
(1915, S. D. N. Y.) 224 Fed. 566; s. c. (1i5, C. C. A. 2d) 227 Fed. 46; Whitwell
v. Continental Tobacco Co. (19o3, C. C. A. 8th) 125 Fed. 454. As pointed out by
Judge Waddill in the Colgate case, price-cutting is frequently in the long run
detrimental rather than beneficial to the public. See also The Right to Refuse to
Sell (1916) 25 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 194. For the reasons stated by Judge Hand
in the Goodyear case, it is also believed that the Clayton Act did not destroy the
Rubber Company's privileges to do the acts complained of.
PRoHmITIoN-FuNcTIoNs OF THE WRT.--The city of Cleveland had sought in
the Court of Common Pleas an injunction against the Cleveland Telephone
Company to restrain it from charging rates higher than those fixed in the city
ordinance. At the time a proceeding was being carried on before the State
Public Utilities Commission to determine the reasonableness of a schedule of
t~lephone rates filed with it by the Telephone Company, which contended that
the Commission had sole power to fix such rates. The Company as relator now
sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court restraining the Common
Pleas from going on with the injunction proceeding. Held, that the relator was
not entitled,to have the writ issued, as the Common Pleas had jurisdiction to
determine which body haid power to fix the rates. Wannamaker, J., concurring
specially; Jones, J., dissenting. State ex rel. Cleveland Telephone Company
v. Court of Common Pleas (1918, Ohio) i2o N. E. 335.
See COMMENTS, p. 482, supra.
PRorERTY-ADwans- PosSESSION By TRUSTEE UNDER TRUST VoI AS PERPE-
TuiTY.-The testatrix in 1886 executed a declaration of trust of certain real
estate in Baltimore, containing a provision in favor of the American Colonization
Society. Upon her death in "I8go the trustees filed their petition and took
possession under order of the court. More than twenty years later the testatrix's
heirs and residuary legatees had the trust declared void, as an active trust with
no time limit in violation of the rule against perpetuities in Maryland. But the
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heirs were held barred from recovering the realty by the adverse possession of
the trustees for 27 years. The Colonization Society then filed their bill against
the trustees demanding the corpus of the property; the State filed its bill
claiming the property as escheat. Held, that neither plaintiff was entitled to
relief. American Colonization Society v. Latrobe (i918, Md.) 1o4 Atl. 12o;
s. c. (9W7) I31 Md. 296, ioi At1. 78o; s. c. (1917) 129 Md. 6o5, 99 Atl. 944,
L. P- A. I917C 937.
See COMMENTS, p. 488, supra.
TORTs-ExPECTAiox op BEI iT-INTERNcE By OuTsmma.-The plaintiff
sued for damages, alleging that the defendant had negligently driven piles
through the intake pipes of a city's water system; that before the damage was
repaired a house insured by the defendant took fire, and burned down because
the defendant's negligence had prevented the municipality from furnishing water
enough to quench the fire. Held, on demurrer, that the complaint stated a cause
of action. Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Simmons Co. (I918, Wis.) I68 N. W. i99.
A tort action will lie for wilfully inducing a third party to break a contract
with the plaintiff. Lumley v. Gye (1853, Q. B.) 2 E. & B. 216; Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co. (igo8) i7 Md. 574, 69 Ati. 405, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.)
746 and note; but see Jackson v. Morgan (91) 49 Ind. App. 376, 94 N. E. 021.
A fortiori should it lie where the defendant, not indirectly by persuasion, but by
his sole direct act, wilfulfy prevents performance of a duty to the plaintiff. Nor
has recovery been limited to persons having a contract immediately with the
party prevented. Wakin v. Wakin (1915) ni9 Ark. 509, i8o S. W. 471,
commented on (1916) 25 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 4o7 (where plaintiff was liable to
indemnify the surety on a bond, forfeiture of which defendant induced). Nor
has it always been insisted on that the defendant's action be wilful. Twitchell v.
Glenwood-Inglewood Co. (915)' 131 Minn. 375, i55 N. W. 621 (notice of third
party's duty to plaintiff was enough); Wilkins v. Weaver [1915] 2 Ch. 322;
but see (1916) 25 YALx LAW JoUIRAL, 5o9. The principal case stands on what at
first seems less cogent ground. A taxpayer has no right against either the
municipality, or a water company under contract with the municipality, that they
shall furnish him water to protect his property from fire. Wallace v. Mayor, etc.
of Baltimore (914) 123 Md. 638, 91 Atl. 687; (1918) 27 Y'A LAw JOURNAL,
ioo8, zoi8. But he has a reasonable expectation that they will, to his benefit,
exercise their legal privilege so to furnish. Some similar expectations the law
protects, by imposing duties on third parties not to interfere in certain ways
with the realization of the expectation. So with good will, i. e., the expectation
that third parties will exercise their privilege of dealing with the plaintiff; so
with the expectation of "free flow of labor"; so with an employer's expectation
that his men, barring outside persuasion, will continue to exercise their privilege
of working for him. See Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions (i918) 27 YALE
LAw JouRNAL, 779, commenting on Hitchman, Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell (9W7)
38 Sup. Ct 65; Lewis v. Bloede (1912, C. C. A. 4 th) 2o2 Fed. 7; Hutton v. Waters(915) 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S. W. 134, L. R. A. i9i6B 1238. So also perhaps, with
an expectation that a testator will allow his property to come to the plaintiff.
See (917) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 263. Nor need the expectation be always that
another person confer the benefit. Keeble v. Hickeringill (18O9, K. B.) ii East,
574 (frightening away birds ordinarily landing on plaintiff's property). But in
all the above cases "malice" was involved: i. e., a will to damage the plaintiff,
without such justification as made the damaging privileged. The principal case
presents the question how far expectations otherwise protected by the law should
also be protected against negligence of third parties, where no malice is involvied.
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In the case of "interference" with contracts, the answer has sometimes been:
not at all, although loss was caused to the plaintiff immediately by the defendant's
act. La Sociit Anonyme de Remorquage e Hilice v. Bennetts [1911] I K. B.
243, 27 L. T. Rep. 77 (defendant sank a barge plaintiff was actually engaged in
towing); see also Homan v. Hall (1917, Neb.) 165 N. W. 88I, (1918) 27 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 704. Yet, where the loss suffered was similarly immediate a
mere-though very actual-expectation has been protected. Metallic Compres-
sion. Casting Co. v. Fitchburg R. Co. (1872) iog Mass. 277 (hose actually serving
to put out fire negligently cut by defendant). The principal case is weaker in two
ways: the damage to the water system was done with no notice of active danger to
the plaintiff ; and it was done a week before the fire. Both notice and immediacy
may well be of importance in determining the reaction of community sentiment
and so of the law. It is to be noted that the chain of causation in such cases is
unusually long. It must be shown that the thing desired would have benefited
the plaintiff, had it occurred, e. g., put out the fire; that it would in reasonable
expectation have occurred; and that it was the defendant's act which prevented
its occurrence-the causation here being further weakened in all persuasion cases
by the factor of the "persuadee's" own will. It is believed that extension of
such protection of expectations, against negligence, will turn on two factors: on
a strict requirement of immediacy of causation-which might have served to
distinguish the instant case from that in Massachusetts-; and on the policy of
limiting the number of actions arising out of one act, recovery being denied to
a party damaged only in second instance, when the act gives a cause of action to
the party more directly injured-which would serve to distinguish the contract
cases denying recovery.
TORTS-ILLEGAL OPERATION OF JiTNEY BUSSEs-RIGHT OF STREET RAILWAY TO
INJUNcTIN.-The defendant was operating jitney busses without license or
bond, in violation of the statute. The plaintiff, a street railway with which the
defendant competed, sued to enjoin further illegal operation. Held, that the
injunction be granted, as the defendant's acts were an actionable interference with
the plaintiff's property in its franchise; and as the defendant's illegal use of the
public streets constituted a public nuisance to the special damage of the plaintiff.
Puget Sound Traction, etc. Co. v. Grassineyer (1918, Wash.) 173 Pac. 504.
See COMMENTS, p. 485, supra.
TORTS-MENTAL SUFFERING-NEGLIGENT Loss OF ASHES OF DECEASED CHILD.-
The plaintiffs had paid the defendant $12 to cremate the body of their child, to
supply an urn for the ashes, and to keep them until called for. Three years
later, when the ashes were demanded, they could not be found; whereupon the
plaintiffs brought suit on two counts, one sounding in contract, the other in tort
for negligent loss of the ashes, entailing mental suffering. Upon verdict judg-
ment was entered for $12 on the first count and for $3oo on the second. Held,
that the judgment on the count sounding in tort was erroneous, as no damages
were recoverable for mental suffering where there was no accompanying
"physical invasion" of the plaintiffs' rights. Kneass v. Cremation Society (1918,
Wash.) 175 Pac. 172.
It is generally iecognized that the next of kin has a right, for the purpose of
burial, to the body of the deceased in the same condition in which it was at the
time of death. Violation of this right by negligent or wilful mutilation of the
body gives rise to a right to recover increased burial expenses as compensatory
damages. See Long v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. (195o) I5 Okla. 512, 520; 86 Pac.
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289, 292. And mental suffering caused by wilful violation of the right may be
compensated in damages. Finley v. Atlantic Transportation Transport Co.
(r917) 22o N. Y. 249, 115 N. E. 71S, commented on (917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
790; Larson v. Chase (i89i) 47 Minn. 307, 50 N. W. 238. Many states admit
such recovery, although the violation of the right is merely negligent. Wright
v. Beardsley (19o7) 46 Wash. i6, 89 Pac. 172 (negligent burial); Renihan
v. Wright (i8go) 125 Ind. 536, 25 N. E. 822; Kyles v. Southern R. Co. (i9o8)
147 N. C. 394; 6I S. E. 278; contra, Long v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., supra; Awtrey
v. Norfolk, etc. R. Co. (1917) 121 Va. 284, 93 S. E. 570, commented on (1918)
27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 416 (omission to notify before burial; distinguishable
because of the bailment in the principal case). The principal case presents,
apparently for the first time, the question of whether the rule should be extended
to cover the case of ashes after cremation. It has been argued that in the case
of the body recovery is wholly anomalous, since the plaintiff would have no
recovery for his mental angulish if the injury had been inflicted on the body of
another which was alive, not dead. But this contention applies with equal force
to, and is refuted by the cases involving wantonness, and can hardly be invoked
to deny extension of the rule to ashes. It is believed that the same rules should
apply throughout to the ashes as to the body. The interest to be protected is the
next of kin's satisfaction in fitting disposal of the remains, which is equally
strong in the two cases. It has, however, been argued, as in the principal case,
that mental suffering produced by negligence will never be compensated unless
it accompanies actionable physical damage to the plaintiff. Awtrey v. Norfolk,
etc. R. Co., supra. This argument in such cases as the present seems to rest
on a confusion. In the case of the living, the interest in peace of mind and that
in peace of body are intimately connected in fact; normally the one is not
violated save in conjunction with the other. But the interest in a dead body
has nbne of the elements of physical enjoyment. A "physical invasion" of that
interest is unthinkable. Cf. (1918) 28 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 171. Mutilation,
desecration, improper burial, and loss, all have from this, angle one and the
same effect: to lacerate the feelings of the living. It may be that that protection
should not be accorded against mere negligent violation; but that question should
be settled on its own merits: to require accompanying "physical injury" is to
require the factually and logically impossible. The same would seem to hold true
of ashes. That the change in physical and chemical form has produced a thing
capable of true ownership ought not, it is believed, to alter the nature of the
protection accorded the only serious interest involved, any more than does the
possibility that a corpse might by lawful appropriation to scientific purposes be-
corie property. Cf. Long v. Chicago, etc. R., supra. The principal case, though
attempting to distinguish Wright vo. Beardsley, supra, has in effect overruled that
case, and, it is believed, on insufficient grounds.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-ILLEGAL EMPLOYMENT OF MINOR-COMPENSATION
AcT NOT APPLicABLE.-In violation of a state law defendants employed in their
store a girl under fourteen. They in good faith believed her to be over that
age, as she so represented and also produced a "permit" from a government
official. She was killed because of defendant's negligence. In an action brought
to recover damages to her estate the defendants claimed that as both they
and the deceased had accepted the Workmen's Compensation Act, recovery could
be had only under its provisions. Held, that her estate was entitled to recover
on the statutory liability for negligently causing death. Sechlich v. Harris-Emery
Co. (1918, Iowa) I69 N. W. 325. In a similar action in New York the same
result was reached. Wolff v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills (1918, App Div.) 173
N. Y. Supp. 75.
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The court held that the employment of the deceased was unlawful, even
though defendants in good faith believed her to be over fourteen. The
agreement on her part to accept the terms of the Compensation Act was there-
fore not legally effective. Many of the earlier cases in other jurisdictions,
cited in the opinion, did not involve the element of misrepresentation by the
employee and consequent good fdith on the part of the employer. If we
accept the court's interpretation of the law forbidding child labor-an interpre-
tation which is in accord with the great weight of authority-the conclusion
reached in the principal case logically follows. But where the minor is lawfully
employed to do .certain kinds of work and is given a prohibited kind to do,
it has been held that since the original contract of employment was lawful,
recovery can be had only under the Compensation Act. Foth v. Macomber &
Whyte Rope Co. (1gx5) 16I Wis. 549, 154 N. W. 369. Contra: Lostutter v.
Brown Shoe Co. (I916) 2o3 Ill. App. 517. The question may be raised whether,
even if the minor is entitled to damages because his agreement is not binding
on him, he may not, if he prefers, hold the employer to the latter's agreement
to accept the terms of the Compensation Act. In the law of contracts it is
held that an adult cannot set up the infancy of the plaintiff as a defense to an
action at law for damages, so long as the infant has not disaffirmed. Harris v.
Musgrove (1883) 59 Tex. 4o. Because of the lack of mutuality, however, the
infant while still under age cannot have specific performance. Flight v. Bolland
(1828, Eng. Ch.) 4 Russ. 298. Nevertheless, in the only case which has been
found deciding the point it was held, simply on the authority of the cases per-
mitting the infant to treat his agreement as a nullity, that he could not elect
to take compensation instead of damages. Apparently the court took the view
that he was not an "employee" within the meaning of the Compensation Act.
Messmer v. Industrial Board (19x8, IIL) xi8 N. F. 993.
